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Abstract. ‘Squeeze-out” is considered as a situation, where a controlling shareholder 
exercises his legal right to oblige the minority shareholders of a targeted listed company to 
sell their shares of the target to him, which brings the target company private. This article 
discusses the topic of fair squeeze-out compensation from both European and US (Delaware) 
perspectives. The author of this paper argues that though legal settings of squeeze-outs and 
determination of fair compensation of squeeze-out differs from country to country, some 
general insights might be identified that in their own turn would allow to identify main 
practical and theoretical problems of protection of minority/majority shareholders’ rights 
related with the fair squeeze-out compensation. 
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Introduction
For the purposes of this article, the term ‘squeeze-out” is considered as a situation, 
where a controlling shareholder exercises his legal right to oblige the minority 
shareholders of a targeted listed company to sell their shares of the target to him, 
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which brings the target company private1. Conflict between the interests of minority 
and majority shareholders is one of the main elements that form the core of problems 
analyzed by the theory of corporate law2. The squeeze-out, as it is understood for the 
purposes of this article, is the classical example of such contraposition. Striking the right 
balance between the interests of minority/majority shareholders or, in other categories, 
interests of minority shareholders and facilitation of the efficient takeover market is 
one of the most troublesome tasks for the legislature and the judiciary dealing with the 
squeeze-out cases3. This seems especially true with regard compensation paid to the 
expelled shareholders in squeeze-out transactions. Application of too stringent (pro-
minority) criteria for the determination of a fair price in squeeze-outs may reduce the 
number of value creating takeover transactions. However, the introduction of too lenient 
requirements to validate the squeeze-out price as “fair” may encourage opportunistic 
behavior of controlling shareholders and subsequently lead to the initiation of transactions 
to the detriment of minority shareholders. 
Legal acts of most European and non-European jurisdictions do not provide elaborate 
and direct procedures for determination of adequate compensation in the squeeze-outs 
(at least it seems true for the legal system of Germany4, Delaware5, Canada6, Belgium, 
France, the UK and the Netherlands7). The lack of legal certainty (which, it can be 
argued, is not necessarily a shortcoming, as ‘the rule of reason’ approach might be more 
appropriate to judge the cases, each having its’ own individual features) also contributes 
to the number of problematic issues related to the determination of appropriate 
compensation in the squeeze-out transactions. Due to the lack of legal certainty and the 
1 It should be noted that some authors (see Ventoruzzo, M. Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and 
Reform Proposals. Virginia Journal of International Law. 2010, 50(4): 842–917, 842, footnote 1) claim that 
the term “squeeze-out” should refer to the cases when management of a company seeks to extract private 
benefits from the company and that the term “freeze-out” should be used to define buy-outs of the remaining 
shares in the listed companies resulting in their de-listing. Though in scholarly literature terms “squeeze-
out”, “freeze-out” or “buy-out” occasionally are used interchangeably, the author of this paper will keep to 
the European tradition and use the term “squeeze out”. 
2 Kraakman, R. et al. The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004.
3 Burkart, M. and Panunzi, F. Law working paper No 10/2003: Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, Sell-out and the 
Dynamics of the Tender Offer Process. 2003, Stockholm Institute of Transitional Economics & Department 
of Finance, Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR [interactive]. [accessed on 10-08-2011]. <http://ssrn.
com/abstract=420940>, p. 6.
4 Elsland, S. and Weber, M. Squeeze-outs in Germany: Determinants of the Announcement Effects [interacti-
ve]. [accessed on 10-08-2011]. <http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/dgf/program/CPaper137.pdf>, p. 2.
5 See, e. g., Subramanian, G. Fixing Freezeouts. Yale Law Journal. 2005, 115: 2–70.
6 Hunter, C. and Potter, K. Legal and Practical Issues for Business Valuation in Shareholders Agreements 
and Minority Shareholder Rights. Paper presented to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Business Valuators 
Calgary Chapter on October 0 (wrong day), 1997 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-08-2011]. <http://www.
macleoddixon.com/documents/Business_Valuation_in_Shareholders_Agreements_and_Miniority_Share-
holder_Rights.pdf >, p. 8.
7 See Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L. Balancing the Interests of Minority and Majority Shareholders: 
A Comparative Analysis of Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rights. ECFR 4/2009, p. 391–439.
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above-mentioned circumstances, it is not surprising that litigation on the issue of the fair 
price (on re-evaluation of the squeeze-out price) is extensive8. 
The object of this paper is legal regulation of the “fair” price in the squeeze-out 
transactions. Mainly, the legal regulation of Delaware, EU-level legal regulation and 
regulation of some EU member states will be considered9. The author of this paper 
argues that though legal settings of the squeeze-outs and the determination of fair 
compensation of the squeeze-out differs from country to country, some general insights 
might be identified. Following that, by employing comparative strategy and using 
qualitative literature analysis as the main method as well as applying traditional legal 
techniques of formal logic (systematical analysis, reduction and deduction), the author 
of this paper will try to identify generic features of the legal regulation of the “fair” 
price in the squeeze-out transactions and evaluate such features with regard interests 
of minority and majority shareholders by identifying the main practical and theoretical 
problems.
To the best knowledge of the author, the issue of the fair squeeze-out compensation 
on EU and EU member states level has been most recently addressed by Kaisanlahti10, 
who considered the role of bid prices in determining the fair value of securities in post-
bid squeeze-outs11, and indirectly by Van Der Elst and Van Den Steen12, who addressed 
the issue whether general legal regulation of squeeze-out right in some EU member 
states is equivalent with regard interests of minority shareholder13, and also Ventoruzzo14, 
who examined the differences between European and US approaches towards general 
regulation of the squeeze-outs15. In the US, the bulk of recent scholarly works directly 
or indirectly addressing the issue of the fair compensation in the squeeze-outs is even 
more extensive16. However, none of this literature directly aims to derive common 
insights regarding fair compensation from US/EU/EU member states perspective and 
provide their evaluation with regard interests of minority and majority shareholders by 
identifying the main practical and theoretical problems. In the wake of an increasing 
8 Ibid.; Rathausky, U. Squeeze-out in Deutschland: Eine Empirische Untersuchung zu An-fechtungsklagen 
und Spruchverfahren, Die Aktiengesellschaft, R24-R26. 2004.
9 Legal regulation of Delaware is considered as it is generally valued as the most attractive corporate 
environment in the United States of America, i.e. more than 50% of all American companies trading their 
shares in regulated markets have opted for the law of Delaware (See http://corp.delaware.gov/). Delaware 
courts have dealt with a significant number of squeeze-out cases concerning the issue of “fair” price (or “fair” 
value), therefore, its experience on the issue will indisputably provide valuable insights when combined with 
the EU level and EU member states level approach. 
10 Kaisanlahti, T. When Is a Tender Price Fair in the Squeeze-out? European Business Organization Law 
Review. 2007, 8: 497–519.
11 Ibid, p. 497.
12 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7.
13 Ibid., p. 393.
14 Ventoruzzo, M., supra note 1. 
15 Ibid., p. 885.
16 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts. 50 B.C. 
L. Rev. 2009: 1021–1068; Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. The Short and Puzzling Life of the Implicit 
Minority Discount. 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2007–2008, 2: 1–61 and other.
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number of transcontinental and cross border mergers and acquisitions17, where different 
legal regimes apply to a target company and a bidder, the discussion offered by this 
paper seems to be even more topical.
This article starts with a brief introduction to different squeeze-out legal regimes, 
which is necessary to frame the further discussion. The article continues to introduce the 
reader with a legal framework on the fair squeeze-out compensation. Subsequently, the 
answers to the questions which price is considered as fair and how it is determined are 
presented and, finally, the conclusions are drawn.
1. Roadmap
Though it can be reasonably assumed that the rationales for going private are the 
same in both the EU and the US, i.e. avoidance of agency costs and compliance with 
listing-related reporting and other requirements18, economies of scale19, constant under-
pricing of publicly traded shares20, improved debt-to-equity ratio and tax mitigation21, 
etc., legal options to execute a squeeze-out are different.
In the US (Delaware), currently there are two legal options for a majority shareholder 
to implement the squeeze-out. The first is a statutory “long-form” merger22, where 
subject to a prior opinion of the management board of both merging companies23 and 
majority of minority (shareholders) approval24 the forced-out shareholders are offered 
compensation in cash or in shares of the controlling company. The second option is 
the so called “two-tier” squeeze-out25, which is a combination of a properly structured 
17 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report 2006. FDI from Developing and 
Transition Economies: Implication for Development. 2006 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-08-2011]. <http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf>.
18 See Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids. 10 
January, 2002, Brussels [interactive]. [accessed on 10-08-2011]. <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
company/docs/takoverbids/report_en.pdf>, p. 60; Regner, W. D. Going Private in the US. International 
Financial Law Review, Supplement: The 2006 Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions. 2006 [interactive]. 
[accessed on 10-08-2011]. < http://www.iflr.com/?Page=17&ISS=21679&SID=624573>; Pritchard, A. C. 
Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price. Berkeley Business Law 
Journal. 2004, 1(83): 83–111, 83.
19 Pinto, A. R. and Branson, D. M. Understanding Corporate Law. 2nd edition. New York: M. Bender, 2004, 
p. 260.
20 Ventoruzzo, M., supra note 1, p. 848.
21 Lehn, K. and Poulsen, A. Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions. 44 J. Fin. 
1989, 771; Van der Elst, C. and Van Den Steen, L. Working Paper: Opportunities in the M&A Aftermarket: 
Squeezing out and Selling out. Financial Law Institute, University Gent, 2006, p. 9.
22 Delaware General Corporation Law [interactive]. [accessed on 10-08-2011]. <http://delcode.delaware.gov/
title8/c001/index.shtml - P-1_0>, Art. 251. 
23 Ibid., Art. 251 (b).
24 Ibid., Art. 251 (c).
25 Furlow, C. V. Back to Basics: Harmonizing Delaware’s Law Governing Going Private Transactions. 40 
Akron L. Rev. 2007, 85: 85
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first-tier tender offer26 and a second-tier “short-form” merger27, which derives from 
a statutory right of a mother company to effect a merger with its daughter company, 
in which it holds at least 90% of shares28. A tender offer is addressed directly to the 
target’s minority shareholders and the board of the target company is not required to 
approve the terms and conditions of the offer.29 However, a committee of independent 
directors would be formed to give their opinion on conditions of the tender offer, i.e. 
to recommend either rejecting or accepting the offer, stay neutral or state that they are 
unable to take a position on the offer.30 In the second-tier, shares of the controller are 
offered as a compensation for dissenting shareholders.31 Minority shareholders, who did 
not bid their shares in the first-tier tender offer, receive a compensation for their shares 
after the second-tier merger is completed.
The “long-form” merger creates a conflict of interests’ situation, as it is the 
controlling shareholder who enjoys control with regard boards of the acquiring 
company and the target32. This poses an inherent conflict of interests, as the controlling 
shareholder will have the power to influence both parties to the transaction and thus also 
the consideration offered to the minority shareholders for their shares.33 However, the 
first-tier tender offer in the “two-tier” squeeze-out transaction is generally considered as 
not coercive34, i.e. the controller would obtain the right to enter into the second phase, 
where the minority is actually squeezed-out only if a considerable part or the minority 
shareholders would bid their shares in the first phase35. As ninety percent is the critical 
threshold in a tender offer squeeze-out, the controller typically conditions its offer on 
getting to 90 percent control36.
As it has been already mentioned, the conflict of interests is inherent to the “long-
form” merger, whereas such conflict in a case of the two-tier squeeze out (first-tier tender 
offer) is absent. Moreover, a board of directors has no statutory role with regard to the 
first-tier tender offer, though it is otherwise in the case of the “long-form” merger37. 
26 Here, as in other cases, a tender offer means a public offer addressed to all shareholders of a target company 
in order to gain sufficient control of the target company – in this case, at least 90% of target’s shares (see 
Aronstam, B. R.; Balotti, R. F. and Rehbock, T. Delaware’s Going Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections 
for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration. Business Lawyer. 2003, 58: 
519–558., 526).
27 Abrams, K. G. and Laster, T. New Delaware Rules for Going Private Transactions. Insights. 2005, 19(7): 
9–13, 9.
28 Delaware General Corporation Law, supra note 22, section 253.
29 Iacono, C. Tender Offers and Short-Form Mergers by Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law: The 
‘800-Pound Gorilla’ Continues Unimpeded - In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation. Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law. 2003, 28: 645–689; 651–652.
30 Subramanian, G., supra note 5, p. 17.
31 Iacono, C., supra note 29, p. 655.
32 Subramanian, G., supra note 5, p. 9.
33 Ibid.
34 Aronstam, B. R.; Balotti, R. F. and Rehbock, T., supra note 26, p. 526.
35 Subramanian, G., supra note 5, p. 17–18.
36 Subramanian, G., supra note 5, p 18.
37 In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. CV-A-18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001), 
para. 7.
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These dissimilarities have led to different standards of judicial review to the squeeze-
outs based on the choice of transactional form38, i.e. the “long-form” merger would be 
reviewed by Delaware courts under the “entire fairness test”39, which encompasses fair 
dealing and fair price40, and the “two-tier” squeeze-out would not, the only option for the 
minority being the right of appraisal41. 
On the EU level, squeeze-out right was introduced by Thirteenth Company Law 
Directive on Takeover Bids42 (hereinafter – the Directive). The Directive introduced (as 
some authors call it)43 the take-over squeeze-out, i.e. the squeeze-out, which is available 
to the bidder only after the tender offer (also referred to as a takeover bid – a general 
bid for shares, which are admitted to trading on a regulated market44), which is now the 
minimum standard in the EU member states. 
The Directive mandates that the member states provide the bidders with the right 
to squeeze out the minority shareholders within a three-month period, immediately 
following the end of the acceptance period “in one of the following situations”: (a) the 
bidder holds no less than 90% of the target’s securities and 90% of the target’s voting 
rights (member states may increase the threshold up to 95%), or (b) at the bid’s closing 
the bidder acquires 90% of the target’s securities, which it did not already hold at the 
commencement of the offer. As some authors claim, these options are alternatives and 
represent the account of national traditions in the member states45, i.e. option (a) follows 
the continental tradition, whereas option (b) derives from UK company law46. 
Despite the harmonization efforts on the EU, national legislators still struggle to 
provide new or retain the existing pre-Directive rules on the squeeze-out rights, which 
are outside the limited scope of the Directive47, i.e. most of the EU member states allow 
the so called “corporate squeeze-outs”48, e.g. the EU member states like Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands, Germany49 and Czech Republic50 allow the squeeze-outs regardless 
38 Subramanian, G., supra note 5, p. 7.
39 Aronstam, B. R.; Balotti, R. F. and Rehbock, T., supra note 26, p. 523.
40 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) at 711 . According to the court, fair dealing focuses 
on the process and the conduct of the controlling shareholder, including “how the transaction was timed, 
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the 
stockholders were obtained”. Fair price, on the other hand, concerns the economic and financial aspects of 
the transaction: its market values, assets, future prospects and earnings. The court stated that although the 
entire fairness test had two elements, it was not bifurcated and the transaction had to be examined as a whole.
41 Gilson, R. J. and Gordon, J. N. Controlling Controlling Shareholders. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review. 2003, 152(785): 785–843, 818–819.
42 European Parliament and Council Directive of 21-04-2004 No. 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids. OJ L 2004, 
142: 12–23.
43 See, e. g., Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7, p. 391–439.
44 Report on Issues Related to Takover Bids, supra note 18, p. 54.
45 Kaisanlahti, T., supra note 10, p. 498.
46 Ibid.
47 Van der Elst, C. and Van Den Steen, L., supra note 21, p.15.
48 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7.
49 Ibid., p. 400.
50 Theiss, W. Czech Republic: Squeeze-out Regime. International Financial Law Review. 2006, 25: 70–71.
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of the transaction triggering the threshold. Moreover, the Directive allowed for other 
differences of the legal regulation of the squeeze-outs at the national level (e.g. with 
regard to the threshold, securities, type of companies, etc.). Eventually, as some authors 
conclude, it is hard to find any harmonization in the legal framework for the squeeze-
outs.51
According to Article 15(5) of the Directive, in the squeeze-outs, which fall within 
the scope of the Directive, the squeezed-out minority must be offered the same form of 
compensation as was offered during the preceding bid or cash (the EU member states 
are also free to provide that cash must be offered in any case as an alternative). With 
regard to the corporate squeeze-outs, which fall outside the ambit of the Directive, 
some EU member states, e.g. Belgium52, the Netherlands53 and Germany54, provide that 
compensation can be offered in cash only.
Having shortly discussed the available ways to squeeze-out a minority, reflection 
on legal settings of fair compensation in the squeeze-out context is presented next.
2.  legal regulation: the “fair” price criterion
2.1. “Fair price” and “fair value” in delaware
In Delaware law, two different concepts of “fair price” and “fair value” can be 
distinguished. Minority shareholders in a non-arms length squeeze-out merger (e.g. 
“long-form merger”) are protected by a fiduciary principle, which insures that they get 
a “fair price” for their shares55. The “fair price” relates to the economic and financial 
considerations of the proposed merger, including relevant factors: assets, market value, 
earnings, future prospects and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent 
value of company’s stock56. As it has been already mentioned, the “fair price” is one 
of the limbs of the “intrinsic fairness” test57, i.e. a minority shareholder can request to 
evaluate the actions of incumbent management (acting in conflict of interests’ situation, 
i.e. as in a “long-form” merger case) against the “fair price” criterion58. 
The “fair value” concept is the object of the aforementioned appraisal claims that are 
the only and ultimate option for shareholders, in case there is no notion of unfair dealing 
in the transaction59. By giving the right to appraisal, the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (hereinafter – the DGCL) gives a fair-value escape option, which concentrates 
51 Van der Elst, C. and Van Den Steen, L., supra note 21, p. 36.
52 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7, p. 424.
53 Ibid., p. 430.
54 Ibid.
55 Campbell, R. B. Jr. Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions. North Carolina Law Review. 1999, 
78: 101–152, 102.
56 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra note 40, para. 713.
57 Ibid., para. 710.
58 Campbell, R. B., supra note 55, p. 109.
59 Ibid., p. 111, 112; Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2007), supra note 16, p. 9.
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primarily on valuing the company as a going concern60 and on its liquidation value61. 
Despite this duality, the basic and leading concept of value under the DGCL is that the 
stockholders are entitled to be paid for that, which has been taken from them, viz. his 
proportionate interest in the going concern62.
Despite the obvious differences (which have been already addressed above) between 
the “fair value” (appraisal) and “fair price” (breach of fiduciary duty) proceeding, there 
also might be useful overlaps, i.e. the expropriated corporate opportunity could be the 
basis for fairness proceedings for breach of loyalty obligation and, at the same time, 
if the not taken corporate opportunity is considered as a part of company assets in the 
fair value proceedings63. It is important to note that these two measures have more 
similarities, namely, they serve the same aim to protect the minority shareholders of a 
target company and that they both raise serious problems to courts64 because of the need 
to make financial calculation involving complex corporate finance issues65. Following 
that, the determination of the fair value available via appraisal proceedings would 
anyway include most of the issues that would be raised during the fairness proceedings 
seeking equitable relief66. As this article is not aimed at an elaborate analysis of these 
two remedies at doctrinal level and seeks to identify more practical aspects of coming 
to an adequate compensation for dissenting shareholders in the squeeze-outs, for the 
purposes of this article and simplicity, the term “fair value” would be used to refer to 
both “fair value” in the appraisal proceedings and “fair price” in breach of fiduciary duty 
proceedings. 
The grounds for determining which value should be considered as “fair” at present 
derives from the section 262 of the DGCL, where, according to subsection (h) in 
appraisal proceedings. the Court of Chancery shall determine the fair value of the shares 
exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of 
the merger or consolidation together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount 
determined to be the fair value. The question of the substance of the “fair value” concept 
was addressed in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye67, where it was stated that “the basic 
concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be 
paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going 
concern”68. It should be noted that other cases occasionally describe the concept as the 
true or “intrinsic” value of the stock that has been taken by the merger69. However, 
it seems to be generally accepted that in both appraisal and breach of fiduciary duty 
60 Aronstam, B. R.; Balotti, R. F. and Rehbock, T., supra note 26.
61 Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), para. 141.
62 Tri Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, (Del. 1950), para. 72.
63 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2007), supra note 16.
64 Campbell, R. B., supra note 55, p. 103 and footnote 9.
65 Ibid., p. 104.
66 Glassman v Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A. 2d (Del. 2001), para. 247–248.
67 See Tri Continental Corp. v. Battye,supra note 62.
68 Ibid.
69 See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455-56 (Del. Ch. 1934); see also Roessler v. Sec. Sav. & Loan Co., 
72 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ohio, 1947).
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proceedings, Delaware courts define the fair price as a going concern value (and not a 
third-party sale (or liquidation) value)70. The proxy of value of plaintiff’s shares is “pro 
rata value of the entire firm as a going enterprise”71, therefore, the fair value is minority 
discounts72 free.
The squeeze-out merger creates synergies. Therefore, it should be briefly discussed 
whether such synergies are included in the legal definition of the “fair value”. As it 
can be derived from the statutory rule73, gains arising out of the squeeze-out merger 
should be excluded from the calculation of the “fair value” at least in appraisal cases, i.e. 
the merger should be Pareto-efficient (squeezed-out shareholders should not be made 
worse off)74. Notwithstanding the apparent legal certainty of this statutory limitation, 
some cases suggested that the exclusion is “a very narrow exception to the appraisal 
process, designed to eliminate use of [..] projections of a speculative variety relating 
to the completion of the merger”75. Accordingly, it seems that the case law suggests 
drawing a line between “speculative” and “non-speculative” merger-related gains, the 
latter to be taken into account when deciding on the “fair value”76, but it is not the only 
opinion. Such a position was criticized as inconsistent and overly broad in the part that 
non-speculative values should be included in the valuation77. Also, there were opinions 
that all gains, which are the consequence of inside information (especially undisclosed 
monetary flows), should be included in calculating the fair value of the firm, while other 
merger gains should not78. It should be noted that from the corporate finance perspective 
all reinvestment opportunities known to the controlling shareholder and being an 
integral part of its strategy before the squeeze-out should be included in the “fair value” 
calculations irrespective whether such opportunities where disclosed at the time79.
According to the case law, the value of business opportunity wrongfully usurped 
by the controlling shareholder, which should formally be included in the corporation’s 
assets as a claim – the intangible asset80; all fees paid to the controlling shareholder in 
the breach of fiduciary duty and not at arm’s length (e.g. excessive management fees 
70 See, e.g., Roenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985), para. 942.
71 Kahn v. Tremont Corp., No. Civ. A. 123339, WL 145452, (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996), para. 9.
72 It is generally admitted that control has a value, therefore, it can be assumed that minority shares are worth 
less than the controlling portfolio (see, e.g., Coates, J. C. “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate 
Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions. University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 1999, 6(147): 
1251-1359; Booth, R. A. Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings. 57 Bus. Law. 
2001-2002, 127).
73 Delaware General Corporation Law, supra note 22, Art. 262 (h): “[..] the court shall determine the fair value 
of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger 
or consolidation [..]”.
74 Easterbrook, F. H. and Fischel, D. R. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1996, p. 146.
75 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra note 40, para. 713.
76 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch., Oct. 19,1990), para. 287.
77 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2007), supra note 16, p. 28.
78 Coffee, J. C. Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient 
Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones? Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. 1996, 21: 359–396.
79 Brealey, R. A. Principles of Corporate Finance. 9th edition. 2008, p. 99–102.
80 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
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paid to the mother company, interest from inter-company loan, etc.)81; benefits of the 
pre-merger planned activities that would arise in the future as well as other savings 
arising from the synergy82 should be added to the company’s assets and, therefore, 
included in the fair price calculations, provided that, e.g., the savings were contemplated 
“well before the going private merger”, the savings could have been achieved without 
a merger83 and that the pre-existent cause of the savings was an asset of the corporation 
at the time of the merger (therefore, it should be shared by all shareholders)84. However, 
the situation with the inclusion of synergies in the fair value calculations can be different 
in the breach of fiduciary duty proceedings, as here court might award the minority 
shareholders difference between the compensation received for the shares at the time of 
a squeeze-out and their post-merger price (the date of the court’s award), which might 
reflect all synergies created by the merger85.
To summarize, the “fair value” of a share in the squeeze-out is a proportionate 
part of a firms’ (as a going concern) value, which should take account of the current 
assets of the corporation and the free cash flow generated by those assets and may also 
include corporations’ reinvestment opportunities86. Therefore, as some authors claim, 
the undertaking is not exclusively defined by its present assets, but by the current assets, 
and it is likely to acquire those assets as part of its current corporate policy87. Moreover, it 
is more or less clear that all gains (synergies) from a transaction do not have necessarily 
go to the minority shareholders88.
2.2. Fair price in Eu
Legal story of the “fair price” on EU level is significantly shorter that the above 
presented discussion on the “fair value” in Delaware. According to the Directive, the 
EU member states have to ensure the “fair” squeeze-out price89. The Directive provides 
that the squeeze-out price shall be presumed to be fair if a bidder, who holds (before or 
after the bid) 90% of all capital carrying voting rights of a target90, attracts at least 90% 
of the targeted capital carrying voting rights91. In case of voluntary bids, the bidder can 
offer any price at his discretion, whereas in case of mandatory bid, the lower price limit 
81 Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc, 2004 WL 2271592 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2004).
82 Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004), para. 
47–49.
83 Ibid., para. 48.
84 Ibid., para 49.
85 Gevurtz, F. A. Corporation Law 661. 2000, p. 737.
86 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. 2007, supra note 16, p. 8.
87 Ibid.
88 Pritchard, A. C., supra note 18, p. 87.
89 European Parliament and Council Directive of 21-04-2004 No. 2004/25/EC ,supra note 42, Art. 15(5): 
“Member States shall ensure that a fair price is guaranteed.”
90 Ibid., Art. 15(2).
91 Ibid., Art. 15(5): “[..]Following a voluntary bid [..]the consideration offered in the bid shall be presumed to 
be fair where, through acceptance of the bid, the offeror has acquired securities representing not less than 90 
per cent of the capital carrying voting rights comprised in the bid”.
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is the highest price paid by the bidder for the target’s shares within the period prescribed 
by a Member state92.
The Directive does not provide any further explanation if and when the above-
mentioned presumptions are rebuttable. Some scholars claim that the presumptions 
of the “fair” price are rebuttable, i.e. can be challenged before courts or the authority 
supervising the takeover bid in particular circumstances93. Some authors, in particular 
German commentators, argue that the presumptions are not rebuttable94. In the author’s 
opinion, though the question whether these presumptions are rebuttable or not could 
be decided on the national level, it should be agreed that, as some scholars claim, even 
if the fair price presumptions are rebuttable, it is unlikely that a price considered to be 
fair by legislator would be prone to extensive judicial review (especially in civil law 
countries)95. 
The Directive makes the squeeze-out right available within 3 months period after a 
bid. Therefore, it would be logical if the above-defined fairness presumption is lost if the 
3 months period is exceeded. Moreover, as some authors claim, the fairness presumption 
should be rebutted in case some material information would arise after the bid is closed 
or pre-bid is wrongfully disclosed during the bid information96.
Except for the above mentioned cases, the Directive does not provide any guidance 
on what the “fair price” should be, i.e. the regulation of the “fair price” in other cases, 
which are not explicitly referred to in the Directive (e.g. the “fair price” in corporate 
squeeze-outs), are left for the discretion of EU member states. Of course, the EU member 
states in some cases may introduce additional requirements to those introduced by the 
Directive, as the Directive only aims at providing minimum level of harmonization. 
Some authorities suggest that in cases not directly governed by the Directive the “fair 
price” should be a price determined by the experts97.
Some EU member states, e.g. Italy and the Slovak Republic, directly implement 
provisions of the Directive and always describe a price as fair if it is the price of a 
mandatory tender offer or a voluntary tender offer with an acceptance rate of 90% or 
more98. Other countries, e.g. Spain and the United Kingdom, deem the price of the 
92 European Parliament and Council Directive of 21-04-2004 No. 2004/25/EC, supra note 42, Art. 5(4): “The 
highest price paid [..] by the offeror, or by persons acting in concert with him/her, over a period, to be 
determined by Member States, [..] before the [mandatory] bid [..] shall be regarded as the equitable price”.
93 Van der Elst, C. and Van Den Steen, L., supra note 21, p. 32; Van der Elst C. and Van den Steen L., supra 
note 7, p. 421.
94 Austmann, A. and Mennicke, P. Übernahmerechlicher Squeeze-out und Sell-out. Neue Zeitschrift Für 
Gesellschaftsrecht. 2004, 846, 851; Krause, H. BB-Europareport: Die EU-Übernahmerichtiline – 
Anpassungsbedarf im Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, p. 3; Der Betriebs-Berater. 2004, 113, 
118; Schmidt and Lutter. Aktiengesetz Kommentar. Köln, Schmidt, 2008, p. 3030; Geibeland Süssman, 
WpÜG – Kommentar. München, Beck, 2008, p. 704.
95 Ventoruzzo, M., supra note 1, p. 893.
96 Kaisanlahti, T., supra note 10, p. 510–513.
97 Report on Issues Related to Takover Bids, supra note 18.
98 Maul, S. and Muffat-Jeandet, D. The Directive on Takeover Bids, in: Takeover Bids in Europe: The Takeover 
Directive and Its Implementation in the Member States. Maul, S. et al., eds., 2008, p. 416. On the Slovak 
Republic, see Hazucha, B. and Jurková, M. Slovak Republic, in: Common Legal Framework for Takeover 
Bids in Europe. Van Gerven, D., ed., 2008, p. 375. 
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voluntary or mandatory tender offer price “fair” for the squeeze-out purposes only if at 
least 90% of all targeted shares are acquired during the tender offer99. The rationale to 
depart from the basic rules of the Directive, as some authors suggest, is the provision of 
the higher level protection for the minority shareholders100.
It seems that regarding the EU member states level, the “fair price” outside the 
cases prescribed in the Directive is the price determined by independent experts (e.g. 
Germany101), the price determined by the independent experts and later approved by 
administrative authority (e.g. Belgium102, France103) or determined by administrative 
authorities (e.g. the Netherlands104). As the case may be, the “fair” price is also an object 
of appraisal disputes settled by courts under the request of minority (e.g. the UK105, 
Italy106) or administrative authority (e.g. France). Most of the EU member states fail 
to give an exact standard of value, which would be considered as “fair” (or at least 
scholarly literature or commentaries discussing these standards in English are absent), 
however, it seems that some countries define the “fair value” as “real value” of shares at 
the time of transfer (e.g. the Netherlands107).
3. Which price could be considered as “fair”?
In both common law and civil law jurisdictions the same three main valuation 
standards are recognized to (optionally) determine the fair value in squeeze-out 
transactions, i.e. third party sale (liquidation) value, going concern value and market 
value108 (although, additionally, some authors claim that the appropriate standard might 
be the combination of all these values109). The relevancy of each particular standard is 
case specific and dependant on legal setting of the squeeze-out compensation. 
3.1. market value
The proponents of the market value as an appropriate benchmark for the fair 
squeeze-out compensation relies on the assumption that financial markets are efficient 
99 Ventoruzzo, M., supra note 1, p. 899.
100 Ibid., p.898.
101 Van der Elst, C. and Van Den Steen, L., supra note 21, p. 22–23.
102 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7, p. 424.
103 Van der Elst, C. and Van Den Steen, L., supra note 21, p. 33.
104 Ibid., p. 34.
105 Ibid., p. 29.
106 Ventoruzzo, M. Cross-Border Mergers, Change of Applicable Corporate Laws and Protection of Dissenting 
Shareholders: Withdrawal Rights under Italian Law. 4 Eur. Company & Fin. L. Rev. 2007, 47: 62.
107 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen; L., supra note 7, p. 429.
108  Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1022.
109  Hunter, C. and Potter, K. Legal and Practical Issues for Business Valuation in Shareholders Agreements 
and Minority Shareholders Rights. Presentation [interactive]. [accessed on 11-08-2011]. <http://www.ma-
cleoddixon.com/documents/Business_Valuation_in_Shareholders_Agreements_and_Miniority_Sharehol-
der_Rights.pdf>.
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and, therefore, value of securities in the markets are the best objective measure of the 
fair value110, e.g., some authors claim that market prices might be a proxy for the fair 
value even in cases of illiquid shares (despite existent illiquidity discount) when control 
is absent111. It can be admitted that in some countries (under specific circumstances) 
the market price is actually considered as a measure of the fair value, i.e. the market 
price is considered as the “floor” of the squeeze-out price in Germany112 or arithmetical 
average of the market prices of a target within a specific period of time is considered as 
an appropriate measure of the fair price in Italy113 and Spain114. The market price is also 
one of the elements accounted for in the French ‘multi-criterion’ approach115.
However, it is now widely admitted that the market price cannot serve as a benchmark 
for coming to the fair value in most of the situations, when the fair price is determined, 
e.g., because of the illiquidity (thin trading and absence of marketability) as a market 
value may be discounted relative to the value of the undertaking116. Moreover, efficient 
markets might value shares according to the plans of a controller117 and in case there are 
reasons to believe that the controller might use the company to extract private benefits, 
under-manage the firm (because in such a case the effect of the market for corporate 
control is absent)118 or in other ways seek to gain additional profits while avoiding legal 
supervision, the market price of the shares would be discounted accordingly119. Under 
such settings, the controller would be rewarded for abusive and opportunistic behavior, 
therefore, as some authors claim, this reason alone is sufficient to prove that the market 
price cannot be a measure of the fair value120. Alternatively, the market price might 
fail to reflect the fair price (or at least the current price) of the securities as a majority 
shareholder can plan the timing of a squeeze-out and usually would choose the moment, 
when the market price is depressed121. Also, the market price might not represent the 
fair value in the squeeze-outs because it may be discounted for the very possibility of a 
squeeze-out122.
110 Bebchuk, L. A. and Kahan, M. Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts, in: 
Concentrated Corporate Ownership. Morck, R. K., ed., 2000.
111 See, e.g., Kraakman, R. Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an 
Acquisition Motive. 88 Columbia Law Review. 1998: 891. 
112 Elsland, S. and Weber, M., supra note 4, p. 4.
113 Ventoruzzo, M., supra note 1, p. 885.
114 Ibid.
115 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7, p. 426.
116 Coates, J. C., supra note 72, p. 1262.
117 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1032.
118 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2007), supra note 16, p. 14.
119 Bebchuk, L. A. and Kahan, M., supra note 110, p. 247, 250.
120 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1035.
121 Ventoruzzo, M., supra note 1, p.886.
122 Gevurtz, F. A., supra note 85, p. 736; Bebchuk, L. A. and Kahan, M. The “Lemons Effect” in Corporate 
Freeze-Outs. Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6938, 1999 [interactive]. [accessed on 
11-08-2011]. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226397>.
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On the other hand, some authors suggest that a minority might engage in 
practices that would increase the market price of the shares in hope of receiving higher 
compensation123. 
It follows that in most of the cases the market price could not be considered as 
a proxy of the fair price in the squeeze-outs because of the inherent risks to under-
compensate or over-compensate the minority.
3.2. Third party sale value
The third-party sale value or the liquidation value seems to match the economic 
definition of value (measured by the “second best use” of a particular asset) 124. However, 
as the third-party sale value relies on the prices of similar transactions that include 
synergies generated by those transactions125, it is rejected as an inappropriate measure of 
the fair value by Delaware courts because the legal regulation (which has been already 
discussed above) rules out incorporation of merger-specific synergies in the calculations 
of the fair price in the squeeze-out transactions, i.e. the minority shareholders do not 
have a right to claim for the value that might be obtained in the simulated third-party sale 
transaction126. Neither at EU level, nor at EU member states level it is explicitly stated 
whether squeeze-out related gains should be included or excluded from the calculations 
of the fair price (in some cases, this discussion, at least as some authors suggest127, would 
be irrelevant as the major part of the synergies is related with the aggregation of control, 
which in some cases is already apparent before the squeeze-out price is determined, 
therefore, it should be included in its calculation). However, in any case the third-party 
sale value criterion due to excessive compensation for the expropriated shares might 
deter efficient takeovers. Additionally, the introduction of the third-party sale value 
criterion might encourage the controller to act opportunistically, i.e. to time a squeeze-
out when acquisition price ratios are unusually low and rely on such deflated ratios to 
justify a fair value that would be lesser than the fair value of expropriated shares128. 
As it has been already mentioned, it is explicitly unclear whether the EU level legal 
regulation allows including the synergies created by a takeover into the calculation of the 
squeeze-out compensation, i.e. whether use of the third-party sale criterion is available 
from a legal perspective. As it has been discussed above, the price of a mandatory bid 
is considered fair by the Directive. The price of the mandatory bid is set at the price of 
the mandatory bid triggering transaction, which is usually a price paid for control. Gains 
arising from accumulation of control are genuine ex-merger gains. Therefore, it might 
be assumed that at least in the case of post mandatory bid squeeze-outs, the Directive 
allows including elements of value arising out of the takeover in the fair value. It might 
123 Steinmeyer, R. and Häger, M. WpÜG: Kommentar zum Wertpapiererwerbs- und Über-nahmegesetz mit 
Erläuterungen zum Minderheitenausschluss nach §§327a ff. AktG. Berlin, 2002.
124 Brealey, R. A., supra note 79, p. 535–537.
125 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1037, 1038.
126 McMullin v. Beran. 765 A.2d 910, (Del. 2000), para. 919–920.
127 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1037, 1052.
128 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1037, 1041.
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be further assumed that such ex-merger gains by analogy could be included in the fair 
price calculations in other cases, as well. Therefore, the third-party sale value (at least 
theoretically) should not be completely excluded.
3.3. Going concern value
The going concern value is probably the most widely established concept to measure 
the fair price in the squeeze-outs129. Moreover, it is the standard used by Delaware courts 
in appraisal cases and is generally understood as preceding over the liquidation (third 
party sale) value130 due to the above-discussed reasons. Nevertheless, use of the going 
concern value criterion, which is usually calculated by using discounted cash flow 
analysis (hereinafter – the DCF), in some cases might create unfair results e.g., in Bell v. 
Kirby Lumber Corp. case, court refused to exclusively rely on the liquidation value as a 
proxy for the fair value (as a consequence, shareholders received 254.4$ per share, when 
the liquidation value of assets was at least 456$). It is obvious that under appropriate 
management the going concern value would have been equal of higher than company’s 
assets value. Another case, which is more specific for Delaware, where ex-merger gains 
are excluded from the fair value calculations, is when due to unavailability/unreliability 
of relevant data a comparable company analysis is used to estimate the going concern 
value131. Some authors suggest that the use of the comparable company analysis creates 
information asymmetries due to undisclosed reinvestment opportunities, etc., and, 
therefore, might lead to under-compensation of the minority132. On the other hand, it 
might over-compensate the minority because the data (prices) retrieved from similar 
transactions include synergies, which are deprived from (at least Delawares’ companies) 
the minority shareholders. 
Methods used to determine the fair value are more elaborately discussed in the 
further section of this paper.
4. How the “fair price” is determined?
Courts of one of the most prominent (at least as far as in the concerned squeeze-outs) 
jurisdiction (Delaware) as early as in 1983 admitted that the fair value can be measured 
by any methods recognized by the financial community133. It seems that at least some 
European jurisdictions adopt the same approach, as well (e.g. the Netherlands, where 
court is free to choose the method for the fair price calculation on its own discretion)134. 
In addition, some European jurisdictions (though it is not a generally accepted rule), e.g. 
129 Campbell, R. B., supra note 55, p. 118.
130 Ibid., p. 119.
131 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1037, 1044.
132 Ibid., p. 1037, 1061.
133 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra note 40.
134 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7, p. 429.
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Belgium (as some authors suggest)135, require the use of at least two methods to prove 
the fairness of a squeeze-out price. It also should be noted that the use of one of the 
commonly accepted financial techniques might not be the case as some EU jurisdictions 
(e.g. Spain and Italy)136 employ the use of methods solely based on an arithmetical 
average of the market prices of a particular share within a particular time frame. 
Despite the relatively wide selection of possible methods for measuring fair 
compensation in the squeeze-out transactions, the most popular methods can be 
identified. As it can be derived from the scholarly literature and other sources (case law, 
etc.), the most commonly used methods are the ‘block approach’, comparable company 
analysis and DCF analysis. 
It should be noted that even a price determined by an appropriate method may 
not be the appropriate squeeze-out price, as in some jurisdictions it may be adjusted 
upwards to compensate for the minority, illiquidity and other discounts.
The above referred most widely used methods and price adjustments are addressed 
below. 
4.1. The ‘block approach’
The so called ‘block approach’ or ‘multi-criterion approach’ generally refers 
to the technique, which calculates the fair price of a squeeze-out by arithmetical or 
weighted average of different multiples, e.g. market price, value of company’s assets, 
past earnings, etc.
Till the above-mentioned Weinberger case, the block method, which, where 
possible, took into account weighted average (weight to a particular part varied with 
the circumstances of the case) value of company’s assets, market price of its shares and 
value of its earnings, was an exclusively dominating method for the determination of 
fair or intrinsic value of the share in Delaware137. However, after Weinberger, it was 
replaced by other more modern finance theory compatible methods (mainly, the DCF).
Similarly to the method, which was applied by Delaware courts in the pre-
Weinberger, France administrative authorities call for the squeeze-out price to be 
determined by combining (depending on the relevance of each particular in specific 
case) value of targets’ assets, share trading price, historical performance data, existence 
of subsidiaries and future prospects138. 
Some similarities can also be found in German techniques, where the fair price is 
determined by combining the valuation of a target company (usually the DCF or net 
135 Ibid., p. 424.
136 Ventoruzzo, M., supra note 1, p.885–886.
137 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra note 40, para. 712.
138 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7, p. 426.
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present value of the net profits accrued to the shareholders) and market price of targets’ 
shares139.
4.2. comparable company analysis
The comparable company analysis is a method, which employs financial rations 
(e.g. deal price/earnings, enterprise value/equity before interest taxes and amortization, 
etc.) of comparable companies to determine the value of a target company.The 
comparable company analysis is usually used when there is insufficient data for the 
DCF analysis or where the latter would be not suitable.As some authors claim140, the 
squeeze-out price determined by the comparable company analysis (unless in cases 
when control of a target company is acquired by a bidder beforehand)141 is not in line 
with the legal framework of Delaware, as the fair price in this jurisdiction excludes 
any synergies from the transaction, whereby the price determined by the comparable 
company analysis (using rations from other controlled-aimed transactions) accounts for 
the control premium. 
Usually, the comparable company analysis relies on historical data to measure 
financial standing of a company142. The comparable company analysis does not take 
controllers’ future plans for the target into consideration, therefore, such plans remain 
hidden from the minority shareholders (creating information asymmetry)143 and the 
value of the target company does not account for the present value of such plans.
4.3. The dcF
When using the DCF analysis, the present value of a particular asset is determined 
by calculating the future cash flows that would be generated by the asset and discounting 
such flows with predetermined discount rates144, i.e. the analysis entails three basic 
components: 1) an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and when 
it will do so; 2) a terminal or residual value equal to the future value; and 3) a cost of 
capital, with which to discount to present value both the projected net cash flows and the 
estimated terminal or the residual value145.
Though the DCF is a widely accepted and used method in the EU146 and the first 
choice method to determine firms’ value in Delaware after the Weinberger case, as well 
as in corporate finance theory, it raises two uncertainties towards the calculation of the 
139 Ibid., p. 430.
140 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16.
141 Ibid., p. 1037, 1053.
142 See Eisenhofer, J. W. and Reed, J. L. Valuation Litigation. 22 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. 1997, 
37: 116–119.
143 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1037, 1061
144 Onti,Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 912 (Del.Ch. 1999).
145 Aronstam, B. R.; Balotti, R. F. and Rehbock, T., supra note 26, p. 545 and supra note 199.
146 Van der Elst, C. and Van den Steen, L., supra note 7, p. 430.
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cash flows and the selection of appropriate discount rates147. Such uncertainty can lead 
to competing valuation results148. 
The DCF method also might represent inaccurate results when used to determine 
value of concerns involved in financial activities, as it will not account for the necessity 
to capitalize equity based on regulatory and other requirements.
4.4. minority discount and share price adjustments
Case law and legal acts (or at least recommendations published by administrative 
authorities) of Delaware and some EU member states suggest that the determined price 
of a squeeze-out should be adjusted upwards because the determined price of a targets’ 
shares is discounted for lack of control (e.g. the right to appoint management, etc.). Such 
position derives from the assumption that a corporation and its shares are separate items, 
as shares provide only limited rights over the corporation and thus do not represent the 
complete value of the corporation itself149.
For instance, following the above indicated approach, the courts of Delaware 
attempted to adjust the valuation for a minority discount by adding back a premium 
“that spreads the value of control over all shares equally...”150. This concept of implicit 
minority discount was deeply criticized by Delaware scholars as incompatible with 
the modern theory of corporate finance (which proclaims that the market price of a 
share reflects pro rata value of corporation’s discounted net cash flows) 151 as well as 
incompatible with statutory requirements, which exclude any merger-related gains from 
the fair price in appraisal in cases, where a squeeze-out merger is a transaction to gain 
control152. 
In EU jurisdictions, in both post-bid squeeze-outs and take-over squeeze-outs the 
controller enjoys a sufficient level of control, therefore, the above referred discussion on 
Delaware case law is irrelevant because the value of control is already included in the 
value of the target and should be equally shared by all shareholders (at least so far as the 
standard for the fair price in the squeeze-out is a proportionate part in a going concern). 
It should be noted that there are also other cases, when the controller can exploit its 
position and mismanage the target in order to depress the value of shares by avoiding 
paying the fair price for the expropriated shares153. In such cases, which are relevant 
for both Delaware and EU member states, the same commentators agree that the price 
should be adjusted upwards; however, they assume that other more finance-compatible 
147 Weston, J. F.; Mitchell, M. L. and Mulherin, J. H. Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance. 4th 
edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004, p. 232–255.
148 Cox, J. D.; Hillman, R. W. and Langevoart, D. C. Securities Regulation – Cases and Materials. 4th edition. 
Gaithersburg: Aspen Publishers, 2004, p. 99.
149 See, e.g., Gordon, J. N. and Kornhause, L. A. Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research. 
60 N.Y.U. L. Razv. 1985, 761, 825.
150 Agranoff v. Mille, 791 A.2d 880, 887 (Del. Ch. 2001).
151 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2007), supra note 16, p. 49.
152 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2009), supra note 16, p. 1037, 1052.
153 Hamermesh, L. A. and Wachter, M. L. (2007), supra note 16, p. 6-7.
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techniques than adding a compensation for illusive ‘minority discount’ should be used 
when defining the going concern value instead of a theoretically unsupported implicit 
minority discount154.It is suggested that the earnings or cash flows of a target impaired 
by the mismanagement by a controller can be cured by adjusting the earnings or cash 
flows of the target upwards155.
conclusions
Notwithstanding the fact whether compensation in squeeze-outs is referred to 
as a “fair” price of shares, a proportionate part in a going concern or the real price 
of shares at the time of a squeeze-out, the extent to which minority is compensated 
is mainly dependent on the standard of value and the methodology to calculate such 
value employed. Minority shareholders should receive any and all elements of value 
inherent in a target company at the time of the squeeze-out. However, the minority 
shareholders should not get a part of value created by a majority shareholder. In any 
case, it should be noted that shares of a company may be discounted relative to the value 
of the undertaking. Therefore, an appropriate value of shares should be a proportionate 
part of company’s value, which, on its own turn, should be valued as a going concern 
employing its present assets and pre-planned reinvestment opportunities, unless such a 
standard for compensation would clearly mean unjust results.
Use of majority of minority rule modifications can strike a right balance between 
the interests of minority and majority shareholders. However, qualitative differences 
in between required thresholds of minority shareholders’ approval in the US and in the 
EU post-bid squeeze-outs introduced by the Directive seem to stress different goals, i.e. 
the former being minority/majority neutral, whereas the latter introducing pro-minority 
settings. Following that, the fair price presumption (i.e. that the price accepted by 90% 
of the minority shareholders is fair) introduced by the Directive should be considered 
as not rebuttable.
Unlike in Delaware, the EU level legal framework introduced by the Directive 
suggests that squeeze-out specific synergies should be included in fair price calculations. 
It seems so because a mandatory-bid price, which normally is a price including premium 
for control, is presumed to be fair. One might assume that EU member states, which 
introduce the squeeze-outs in other cases than prescribed in the Directive, would 
retain a similar level of protection for the minority shareholders to that provided by 
the Directive in post mandatory bid squeeze-outs cases. As compensation paid for the 
minority shareholders seems to be more than sufficient (or even of over-compensating 
nature) in the post-mandatory bid squeeze-outs, the presumption defined in the Directive 
should be not rebuttable and national squeeze-outs following the same approach towards 
compensation should introduce similar assumptions. 
154 Ibid., p. 7.
155 Ibid., p. 60.
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One could question whether the squeeze-out price, which is set at the price of the 
mandatory bid (which, on its own turn, is usually set at the level of price paid to gain 
control of a target), can be considered as fair with respect interests of the controller, 
as he is the one (not the target company) who concentrated control and, therefore, 
reap the benefits it offers. However, it should be admitted that at the time of post-bid 
squeeze-out control is also a part of company’s assets, therefore, it should be shared 
by all shareholders, notwithstanding the fact that the minority did not do anything to 
aggregate it.
When deciding on fair compensation for the dissenting shareholder, target’s assets, 
market value of target’s shares, its earnings, future prospects and any other elements 
might be taken into consideration. However, use of particular variables and their weight 
highly depends on the method or methods used. It seems to be widely accepted to rely on 
any of methods that are accepted by the finance community. Such a practice should be 
welcomed, as there is not a single method, which would be suitable for all cases. More 
specifically, it seems to be appropriate to rely on several methods, however, it should be 
an exception applied only in a very limited number of cases, when the date for one of 
the methods is unreliable. 
Minority over-compensating measures (various minority-discounts curing measures 
shifting a squeeze-out price upwards) should be applied only in cases, when there is 
evidence of opportunistic behavior on behalf of a controlling shareholder (i.e. intentional 
mismanagement, failure to disclose material information) and only indirectly, i.e. by 
adjusting cash flows or awarding damages.
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tEISINGa PRIValomo akcIjų PaRdaVImo kaINa
Feliksas Miliutis
Mykolo Romerio universitas, Lietuva
Santrauka. Privalomas akcijų pardavimas yra suprantamas kaip situacija, kurioje 
didysis akcininkas pasinaudoja savo teise privalomai išpirkti smulkiųjų „taikinio“ įmonės 
akcininkų akcijas ir taip „išimti“ „taikinio“ įmonės akcijas iš prekybos reguliuojamoje 
rinkoje. Šiame straipsnyje aptariama privalomo akcijų pardavimo kompensacijos tema tiek 
iš ES, tiek iš JAV (Delavero) teisės pozicijų. Nors priežastys „išimti“ akcijas iš viešos prekybos 
tiek ES, tiek JAV iš esmės yra tapačios, būdai įgyvendinti privalomo akcijų pardavimo teisę 
skiria iš esmės. Nepaisant skirtingų būdų pasinaudoti privalomo akcijų pardavimo teise, ES 
ir JAV jurisdikcijose vyrauja iš esmės vienodas požiūris į standartus ir metodus, naudojamus 
teisingai privalomo akcijų pardavimo kainai nustatyti. 
Šio straipsnio autorius laikosi pozicijos, jog nepaisant kiekvienoje šalyje įtvirtintų 
skirtingų taisyklių teisingai privalomo akcijų pardavimo kainai nustatyti, galima identifikuoti 
bendras tendencijas, kurios, savo ruožtu, padės nustatyti pagrindines praktikoje ir teorijoje 
kylančias didžiojo ir smulkiųjų akcininkų apsaugos problemas, kiek tai susiję su teisingos 
kainos nustatymu. Skirtingi su adekvačios privalomo akcijų pardavimo kompensacijos 
nustatymu susiję konceptai, tokie kaip „teisinga vertė“, „proporcinga dalis veikiančiame 
versle“, ar „teisinga kaina“ ir kiti teisinio reguliavimo elementai, pavyzdžiui taisyklės, 
reglamentuojančios iš sandorio kylančios pridėtinės vertės paskirstymą, standartai ir metodai, 
naudojami tinkamai privalomo akcijų pardavimo kainai nustatyti, yra sutinkami visose 
jurisdikcijose. Visgi, jų turinys ir samprata gali būti skirtingi. 
Visuotinai pripažįstama, jog teisingos kainos standartu paprastai yra laikomas 
„veikiančio verslo vertės“ standartas. Visgi, dėl teisinio reguliavimo ypatumų gali būti ir 
kitaip. 
Daugelyje jurisdikcijų privalomo akcijų pardavimo kainai nustatyti naudojamų 
metodų pasirinkimas nėra ribojamas. Nepaisant to, daugelyje šalių pagrindiniai šiuo tikslu 
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naudojami metodai yra piniginių srautų diskonto ir lyginamosios analizės metodai. Bet 
kuriuo atveju, konkretaus metodo ar kitų technikų (kainos pakėlimas, mažumos daugumos 
taisyklės ir pan.) naudojimas atitiks didžiojo ir smulkiųjų akcininkų interesus tik tada, kai 
šios technikos ar metodai bus priimtini teisinės bazės požiūriu ir tinkami atsižvelgiant į 
konkrečias faktines aplinkybes. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: privalomas akcijų pardavimas, perėmimo pasiūlymas, teisinga 
kaina, teisinga vertė.
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